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Two Cheers for Gentrification
J. PETER BYRNE*
INTRODUCTION
The very word "gentrification" implies distaste.' Advocates for
the poor and ethnic minorities see affluent whites bidding up the
prices for urban housing to levels that force poor families out, depriv-
ing them of affordable housing, perhaps rendering them homeless,
and changing the character of a neighborhood from one that reflects
distinct ethnic and class needs and cultural traditions into a bland em-
porium for expensive consumer goods. Sometimes historic preserva-
tion laws are indicted as particular culprits in setting this dynamic in
motion. A result of these perceptions is that the legal literature on
gentrification, in general, and historic preservation both reflect a dis-
tinctly negative strain.
This essay takes issue with this negative judgment about gentrifi-
cation. That a number of individuals have lost affordable apartments
that were home to them cannot be denied.2 Yet, increases in the num-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks for useful comments go
to Michael Diamond and to participants at a Summer Research Workshop at Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, and to Tom Chance for research assistance. The essay is dedicated to the
memory of Cathy Pfeiffer, friend, neighbor, public school librarian, and tireless catalyst for com-
munity and individual improvement.
1. The term itself seems to have been coined by an English writer, Ruth Glass, in 1964 to
describe the process of middle-class people moving into working class neighborhoods in London
and refurbishing modest houses into "elegant and expensive residences." The author noted,
"Once the process of 'gentrification' starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the
original working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is
changed." Neil Smith, Gentrification, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HousiNG (Willem van Vliet
ed., 1998) (quoting Ruth Glass, ASPECTS OF CHANGE xvii (1964)). A colleague informs me that
in community discussions in his gentrifying neighborhood, the term is scrupulously avoided;
terms referring to physical structures are used, such as "renovation" or "rehabilitation."
2. An ordinary and unself-conscious account of this can be found in a recent Washington
Post article about the renovation of a sixty-unit apartment building near downtown Washington,
D.C. A developer bought the building in a dilapidated state from a bankruptcy sale in 1999 and
substantially renovated the units, which were rented promptly by white-collar workers eager to
move downtown. In the process, drug dealers and a prostitution ring were evicted, but so were
many decent, working class Hispanics who could not afford the higher rents. One resident re-
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ber of affluent and well-educated residents is plainly good for cities,
on balance, by increasing the number of residents who can pay taxes,
purchase local goods and services, and support the city in state and
federal political processes.' My contention here goes somewhat fur-
ther: gentrification is good on balance for the poor and ethnic minori-
ties. The most negative effect of gentrification, the reduction in
affordable housing, results primarily not from gentrification itself, but
from the persistent failure of government to produce or secure afford-
able housing more generally. Moreover, cities that attract more afflu-
ent residents are more able to aggressively finance affordable housing.
Thus, gentrification is entitled to "two cheers,"4 if not three, given that
it enhances the political and economic positions of all, but exacerbates
the harms imposed on the poor by the failures of national affordable
housing policies.
Despite the negative connotation, I prefer to use the term "gen-
trification" rather than anodyne jargon such as "neighborhood revital-
ization." Like other popular terms of reproach ("political
correctness" comes to mind), gentrification uniquely describes a com-
plex social phenomenon rooted in a specific time and place. I use
gentrification to refer to the process by which people of higher in-
comes move into lower income urban areas and seek to change its
physical and social fabric to better meet their needs and preferences.
Students of gentrification have debated whether displacement of
lower income residents from their homes is a necessary element of its
definition.5 My view, clarified below, is that our understanding of the
extent and centrality of displacement is sufficiently problematic that it
should not be considered definitional. Some neighborhoods have
been gentrified by converting industrial lofts to residences and shops,
causing only minimal displacement of existing residents. Some cities,
marked, "The whole demographic of the building had changed. Families were gone. It was
really sad." Ruben Castenada, What a Difference a Rehab Can Make, WASH. POST, June 29,
2002, § 5, at 7.
3. Gentrification also promotes "smart growth," the encouragement of new housing closer
to urban centers and in greater densities in order to prevent sprawl. It is noteworthy that advo-
cates for low-income housing sometimes also oppose smart growth restrictions on new suburban
development because it raises the cost of housing. This also seems wrong-headed because of the
region-wide environmental benefits of more compact growth and because the adoption of re-
strictive growth measures on a regional or state level makes obvious the public's responsibility to
provide affordable housing.
4. . See E.M. FORSTER, Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY (1951).
5. See Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, Dealing with Neighborhood Change: A Primer
on Gentrification and Policy Choices, 2001 BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URB. & METRO. POL'Y 5-
6, available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/urban/gentrification/gentrification.pdf.
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Detroit and Cleveland for example, have sufficient vacant dwellings
that large influxes of higher income residents would place small strain
on housing costs for lower income persons.6 At the same time, low-
income residents who remain in a gentrifying neighborhood with a
low vacancy rate may be harmed by paying a higher percentage of
their income for rent.7
Gentrification has at least two causes.8 First, it most familiarly
reflects a change in preferences by upper income persons about living
in the city.9 Increasing numbers of affluent people view city life as
affording cultural and social opportunities superior to those of the
suburbs, which at the same time may seem increasingly inaccessible
because of urban sprawl and traffic congestion. The scale of this
change should be kept in perspective as suburban growth both in resi-
dences and employment continues to substantially outstrip urban
growth."0 Second, broader economic changes have increased demand
for housing in some cities beyond what the market can supply outside
of formerly marginal neighborhoods.1' Thus, the young professionals
in the Bay Area or Boston who took jobs in the technology sector
during the boom, may have moved to the Mission District or Charles-
town because of the lack of attractive affordable alternatives. Such
demand is more likely in cities with tight housing overall and a vital
tradition of urban living. This cause also reflects a disparity in income
growth for upper income and low-income people. This income dispar-
ity results from widespread changes in the global economy so that
gentrification may be a vanguard of the new post-industrial, or even
post-modern, city.' 2
6. Id. at 62-63; see also Bethany Bonner, Historic Preservation in Detroit: Purpose and
Procedure (2002) (unpublished seminar paper, Georgetown University Law Center, on file with
author).
7. Jacob L. Vigdor, Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?, 2002 BROOKiNGs-WHARTON PA-
PERS ON URB. AFF. 133, 168-69, available at http://muse.jhu.edujournals/urb/toc/urb2002.1.html.
8. Id. at 137.
9. Keith Aoki links this to changes in architectural taste as post-modern architecture fos-
tered a regard for historic architectural styles and details and to a facility with restructuring them
for modern living. Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Mod-
ernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 792-94
(1993). Aoki expresses considerable ambivalence about this taste for the historic, referring at
one point to "bogus antiquity," id. at 824, but his real concern is for the marginalization of low-
income people, as he accepts the claims of mass displacement discussed below. Id. at 818.
10. Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 5, at 8-9.
11. See Vigdor, supra note 7, at 142-44.
12. Aoki, supra note 9, at 800; see also DAVID LEY, THE NEw MIDDLE CLASS AND THE
REMAKING OF THE CENTRAL CITY (1996).
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This essay proceeds as follows. First, I consider in more specific-
ity the complaints lodged against gentrification, with particular atten-
tion to the role of historic preservation, and consider the extent to
which these complaints hit the mark. Second, I try to specify the ad-
vantages for poor and ethnic minorities from gentrification in this so-
ciety given its political structures and history, and argue that these
advantages substantially outweigh the losses they inflict on the poor.
Finally, I suggest how the negative consequences of gentrification
might be minimized, the most constructive path for which is the pro-
motion of increased affordable housing throughout the metropolitan
area. My hope is that the arguments presented will better focus dis-
cussions about the effects on the poor of policies that promote urban
redevelopment.
A personal word before I begin: I am a gentrifier. My wife and I
bought our first house on an outer street of Capitol Hill, Washington,
D.C., in 1982, a neighborhood that had been gentrifying sporadically
since the 1960s. We did so because we preferred the city to the sub-
urbs, preferred living in an area that was economically and racially
mixed, and because we could afford to buy there, but not in a more
wealthy neighborhood in the same geographic region. Many of my
academic and policy views were shaped by involvement in local polit-
ics, educating my children in local public schools (where I served as a
president of the PTA), attending a local church, and discussing end-
lessly with neighbors the path of development of our community. My
experience extends my sympathy in some directions, but deflects it
from others.
I. THE CASE AGAINST GENTRIFICATION
The legal literature has nearly consistently denigrated gentrifica-
tion because of its apparent harm to the urban poor and racial minori-
ties who disproportionately populate urban neighborhoods. Even
articles that concede the benefits to a city as a whole from a return of
the affluent dwell persistently on the injustice to the poor that flows
from loss of affordable housing or changes in neighborhood charac-
ter.13 The prevalence of this opinion is puzzling, given the ambiguity
of empirical data.
13. See e.g., David B. Fein, Note, Historic Districts: Preserving City Neighborhoods for the
Privileged, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 64, 82-83 (1985).
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Michael deHaven Newsom sets the trend in an early article, pub-
lished before the term "gentrification" had become current.1 4 He as-
saulted the "Georgetown syndrome" whereby affluent whites had
redeveloped historic housing in Georgetown, both displacing low-in-
come blacks and obliterating the neighborhood's black heritage.15 He
did not think historic preservation "inherently evil," but argued that,
as practiced, it had become "a hobby of middle- and upper-class
whites."' 6 Newsom argued for a variety of devices by which blacks
could exercise more control over preservation efforts that affect them
to both tell their own story truthfully, and promote their economic
interests.
Newsom made a good point, but Washington, D.C. is unusual in
the extent to which gentrification involved a replacement of black
with white residents. 7 Nationally, most displaced persons may be
white, as white working class neighborhoods have been the favorite
sites for gentrification. t8 Thirty years later, many of Newsom's dis-
tinctly cultural and racial concerns about the effect of historic preser-
vation on neighborhoods have been addressed. Somewhat more of
the higher income newcomers are black. Many preservation initia-
tives celebrate the struggles and achievements of blacks. Several his-
toric districts in Washington, D.C., such as U Street, Shaw, and
LeDroit Park, have been organized around places important to black
culture or evoking significant black residents. 9 Historic preservation
organizations and regulatory authorities enjoy black leadership.2 ° In
14. Michael deHaven Newsom, Blacks and Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & COMTEMP.
PROBS. 423 (1971).
15. Id. at 423.
16. Id. at 431.
17. The demographic consequences of gentrification in Washington are studied in EILEEN
ZErZ, PRIVATE URBAN RENEWAL (1979). Zeitz notes that during the period of gentrification in
Georgetown, 1940 to 1970, Washington gained population (peaking at over 800,000 in the census
of 1950) and went from being 72% white to 72% black. The total population of Georgetown
declined over the same period and the black percentage declined from between 14% and 28% to
about 2%. Id. at 39-43.
18. Richard T. LeGates & Chester Hartman, The Anatomy of Displacement in the United
States, in GENrRIFICATION OF THE CITY 178, 185 (Neil Smith & Peter Williams eds., 1986).
19. See District of Columbia Inventory of Historic Sites, at http://planning.dc.gov/preserva-
tionlpdf/history-inventory_070102.shtm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
20. See Adam Gopnik, Saving Paradise, NEW YORKER, Apr. 22 & 29, 2002, at 76 (profiling
Harlem preservationist Michael Henry Adams). The D.C. Historic Landmark and Historic Dis-
trict Protection Act provides that "all appointments to the Historic Preservation Review Board
shall be made with a view toward having its membership represent to the greatest practicable
extent the composition of the adult population of the District of Columbia with regard to race,




at least some places, the historic preservation movement has been suc-
cessfully integrated.21
Of course, other cultural and racial issues remain. The great ma-
jority of new residents in gentrifying neighborhoods are white, of
which many are gay, while many existing residents are people of
color.22 New residents have different values and preferences, which
will shape local shopping and cultural institutions. Conflicts between
old and new residents may erupt over, for example, school funding or
subsidized housing priorities. Some legal authors have argued that
this kind of change is a wrong perpetrated by gentrification.23
This view seems deeply flawed to me. While some neighbor-
hoods may contain unusual and important cultural institutions for a
particular ethnic group that draw or hold people of that tribe, no
neighborhood remains frozen in some ethnic or class essence. Dy-
namic succession has been the rule in all our urban history. Harlem,
which has experienced significant gentrification in recent years, used
to be German and Jewish, and was named by Dutch farmers who dis-
placed Indians; its black identity reflects the complex movement of
rural southern blacks to northern cities between 1920 and 1970, al-
though today nearly half of its black residents are immigrants from
Africa and the West Indies.24 Inner city people of color have no more
moral or legal sanction for ethnic exclusion than do suburban whites.
That newcomers and prior residents may have different views on
neighborhood issues presents opportunities to both as well as
problems. Neighborhoods may be most attractive when they contain
diverse populations and a variety of indigenous enterprises. The more
plausible cultural concern of gentrifying neighborhoods will be that
continuation of the process may lead to a new homogeneity of afflu-
21. Historic preservation in the District of Columbia has usually been supported by both
blacks and whites. "By and large[,] community members, including African-Americans, saw the
potential of historic preservation as a community development tool, as a way of having control
over their destinies." Jeremy W. Dutra, "You Can't Tear it Down": The Origins of the D.C.
Historic Preservation Act 27 (2002) (unpublished seminar paper, Georgetown University Law
Center, on file with author). This alliance probably was fostered by mutual opposition to the
urban renewal and highway building programs imposed on the district by the Federal govern-
ment in the 1950s and 60s, when District residents had no self-government.
22. See LeGates & Hartman, supra note 18, at 182-83.
23. id. at 196.
24. See Jeffrey S. Gurock & Calvin B. Hunter, Harlem, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK
CITY 523-25 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995). Current gentrification in Harlem by both black
and white homeowners and merchants is described in Rob Gurwit, Up in Harlem, PRESERVA-
TION, July-Aug. 2002, at 40.
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ence-a concern best addressed through enhancement of affordable
housing programs, as explained below.
Plainly, the prime allegation is that influxes of affluent whites dis-
place poor residents both directly, by occupying renovated buildings
that formerly provided low cost rentals, and indirectly, by increasing
the demand for higher quality, more expensive housing within the
neighborhood. Anecdote and common perception suggest that these
harms are real. Yet, the empirical evidence for the extent of such dis-
placement is actually rather inconclusive. The great difficulty has
been establishing a causal relationship between persons moving away
and gentrification.
The federal government generally has taken the view that dis-
placement from gentrification has never been a serious problem.25
Advocates for the poor, on the other hand, have long argued that dis-
placement occurs on a large scale and have called for government ac-
tion to protect low-income residents.26 By 1979, the Legal Services
Corporation had established a national Anti-Displacement Task Force
and prepared a handbook entitled "Displacement: How To Fight It. ' '27
Peter Marcuse, a planner influential with legal reformers argued that,
"[p]ublic policies dealing with housing . . . must have as their clear
objective the elimination of displacement in all its forms, whether by
abandonment or gentrification. ''28 Legal publications during the next
decade tended to adopt this viewpoint and proposed legal barriers to
displacement, many of which would have discouraged the process of
gentrification, such as zoning to prevent redevelopment, rent control,
and special taxes on speculative redevelopment. 29 These authors also
25. U.S. DEP'T. OF Hous. & URB. DEV., DISPLACEMENT REPORT: INTERIM REPORT ON
HOUSING DISPLACEML-NT (Feb. 1, 1979).
26. See, e.g., Richard T. LeGates & Chester Hartman, Displacement, CLEARINGHOUSE RE-
VIEW: J. POVERTY L. 207 (July 1981) [hereinafter LeGates & Hartman, Displacement].
27. LEGAl SFRVS. CORP., DISPLACEMENT: How TO FIGHT IT (1979).
28. Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections, Causes,
and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 229 (1985).
Marcuse takes the dubious view that gentrification worsens abandonment of residential building,
apparently because he thinks that all or most of the new residents in gentrifying neighborhoods
move there from areas being abandoned. Id.
29. See ZEITZ, supra note 17, at 80-83 (describing speculator tax proposal in D.C.); Jon C.
Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-In-
come Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1993); James G. Durham & Dean E. Shel-
don, III, Mitigating the Effects of Private Revitalization on Housing for the Poor, 70 MARO. L.
REv. 1 (1986); Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Bricolage
in the Fight Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 507 (1991); Marcuse, supra note 28;
Ray Telles, Forgotten Voices: Gentrification and Its Victims, 3 SCHOLAR 115 (2000); Molly
McUsic, Note, Reassessing Rent Control. Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
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harbored a general antipathy to the role of private property and mar-
kets in shaping urban space.
3 0
The meaning of "displacement" in this context must be limited, of
course, to persons who move from their homes, but would prefer not
to. Obviously, people move all the time for many reasons; indeed, it is
estimated that half of all urban residents move every five years.3 Di-
rect displacement in the rental market from gentrification would occur
when a landlord raises rents precipitously or withdraws a unit from
the market to refurbish it or sell it for owner occupation in order to
take advantage of neighborhood changes.32 These reflect the most
troubling harm from gentrification: the displaced persons are forced
to move from their homes and often from their neighborhoods by
forces beyond their control. Such persons may experience social dis-
location and a psychological wrench from the severing of emotional
ties." Such harms will be aggravated when the displaced person must
seek housing in a market of rising rents. Direct displacement may also
occur when an owner-occupier feels she must sell when rising prop-
erty values sharply increase the amount of property tax due. Yet, here
the story is more complicated because the owner also has an asset
increasing in value that provides opportunities as well as costs.'
Indirect displacement occurs when, upon the voluntary departure
of existing residents, the owner raises rents, or removes the unit from
the market. The harm here is the loss to the neighborhood of an af-
fordable dwelling. Indeed, both types of displacement, direct and in-
direct, result in the loss of affordable units and highlight the general
need for affordable housing. Some writers have alleged that indirect
30. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income
Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 485 (1987).
31. Vigdor, supra note 7, at 142.
32. Direct displacement and the harm it brings can be caused, of course, by phenomena
other than gentrification, such as loss of employment, fire, or death or illness within a family.
Advocates sometimes tart up their descriptions of displacement through gentrification by em-
phasizing incidents of landlord arson and harassment of tenants, see, e.g., Marcuse, supra note
28, at 215-16, but such misdeeds already are illegal and may distract from the greater challenges
of providing affordable housing.
33. See Kolodney, supra note 29, at 511-12 n.15; Margaret J. Radin, Residential Rent Con-
trol, 15 PHIL. & Pun. Au'. 350 (1986). Vigdor found in his review of the literature, however, that
"[s]tudies tracking the outcomes of those displaced have generally found absolute increases in
well-being, and mixed evidence on changes in well-being relative to [voluntary movers]."
Vigdor, supra note 7, at 150-51.
34. The problem for the low-income homeowner may be that a lack of cash, credit, or expe-
rience with an appreciating asset poses a barrier to managing the asset for maximum value. Of
course, for some owners, the rise in the value of their homes is a godsend, making possible a
comfortable retirement or achievement of other financial goals.
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displacement raises the same concerns as direct and should be com-
bated the same.3 5
It is not clear however, that indirect displacement provides a
ground for opposing gentrification. That increased demand raises
prices is a common feature of a functioning land market, and nearly
everyone is foreclosed from living in certain areas by high prices.
When this occurs in urban areas, it is unlikely to be the result of exclu-
sionary zoning as lower income people recently lived there and the
laws seldom impose large lot or housing unit sizes.36 While public pol-
icy should seek to provide decent housing for all in safe and diverse
neighborhoods, it is not clear what the moral claim is to maintain a
high level of low-income units in any particular area, particularly
when the means of doing so are directed at preventing influxes of
more affluent people that benefit the city as a whole.
That direct displacement by gentrification occurs is certain, but
what has been hard to know is how many people are affected. Al-
though some studies have posited large numbers, they are plagued by
sweeping definitions of displacement and a conspicuous failure to
show that gentrification causes such displacement.3 1 In particular,
they do not compare movements from gentrifying neighborhoods with
moves from others; thus, they fail to show how much displacement
would occur in the absence of gentrification. Two recent studies use
new techniques to measure comparative displacement and find no evi-
dence that gentrification causes significant direct displacement.
In a study in New York City, researchers Freeman and Braconi
looked at surveys during the 1990s of persons who recently moved
into new units and found 5.47% of them could be considered dis-
35. Marcuse argues for a broad understanding of displacement, including what he terms
"exclusionary economic displacement," which amounts to what I term indirect displacement, an
increase in rents that precludes low-income people from taking possession of a unit. Marcuse,
supra note 28, at 214.
36. Historic district designation has been assailed as exclusionary because it may increase
the cost of maintaining existing homes, see Dubin, supra note 29, at 772-73; Fein, supra note 13.
Such designation makes it harder to site new multi-family housing within a district composed of
row houses. See ZEITZ, supra note 17, at 67-69. At the same time, designation may discourage
displacement because it makes the existing scale and architectural character of the neighborhood
the baseline for new development.
37. See, e.g., LeGates & Hartman, Displacement, supra note 26, at 220 (noting that national
"likely displacement is in the 2.4 - 2.8 million persons per year range"); Marcuse, supra note 28,
at 216 (Annual displacement from gentrification in New York City "probably runs between ten
thousand and forty thousand households per year.").
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placed.38 When the researchers compared movements by low-income
people from gentrifying neighborhoods, as opposed to non-gentrifying
neighborhoods, they found that poor households were less likely to
move from the gentrifying neighborhoods. Indeed, they found that
increases in rent were associated with a lower likelihood of moving
rather than a higher one. The authors concluded:
Our research sheds new light on the gentrification process. Al-
though it does not prove that secondary displacement [i.e., from ris-
ing rents] of the poor does not occur in gentrifying areas, it suggests
that demographic transition is not predicated on displacement.
Low-income households actually seem less likely to move from gen-
trifying neighborhoods than from other communities. Improving
housing and neighborhood conditions appear to encourage the
housing stability of low-income households to the degree that they
more than offset any dislocation resulting from rising rent.
39
In another recent study, Jacob Vigdor used data collected by the
American Housing Survey to study changes in the occupation of par-
ticular housing units in Boston during three separate periods.4" The
study found that units containing poor persons at the beginning of any
four-year period were unlikely to have one at the end, but that this
change reflected income mobility more than displacement.4" "In each
time interval, a poor household is actually more likely to exit poverty
than to be displaced by a nonpoor household."42 This led Vigdor to
compare movements from gentrifying and other neighborhoods of
more and less educated persons (a status that does not change as
quickly as income). He found that less educated householders were
more likely to remain in their units in gentrifying neighborhoods than
elsewhere in the city, and no less likely to remain than higher edu-
cated persons in the same neighborhood.43 He also found evidence
that gentrification accelerated socioeconomic integration.44 Vigdor
does not conclude that the poor are not hurt by gentrification, as some
remain in their units paying higher rent without a corresponding in-
38. Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement, 8 THE URBAN PROS-
PECT 1, 2 (2002), available at http://www.chpcny.org. Nationally, 4% to 5% of moves are invol-
untary, and thus can be classified as displacement. Vigdor, supra note 7, at 149.
39. The authors also raise the question whether rent stabilization might be moderating the
pressure toward displacement.
40. Vigdor, supra note 7.
41. Id. at 156.
42. Id. at 157.
43. Id. at 160.
44. Id. at 167-68.
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crease in personal welfare. He does argue for targeted subsidies how-
ever, particularly for elderly renters.4 5 But, he does not find evidence
that gentrification displaces the poor.4 6
These studies should not be taken to prove that gentrification
never causes displacement. We know from our own observations that
it sometimes does, and we can surmise that it must do so in certain
circumstances, such as when rents rise rapidly and relocation costs are
low. Yet, the studies point out that benefits for low-income residents
from neighborhood economic improvement can give them both the
reason and the means to remain despite higher costs. This certainly
calls into question the empirical basis for the demonization of gentrifi-
cation that typifies the legal literature. We need to better understand
the advantages gentrification offers the poor as well as the costs.
II. GAINS FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE
An adequate account of the benefits that gentrification creates
for low-income city dwellers requires some recollection of the histori-
cal development of metropolitan areas since 1945.41 The primary
themes have been the expansion and primacy of the suburbs, first for
residential growth, and second, for retail, commercial, and political
dominance within their states. At the same time, cities lost economic
and political power, as business followed the white middle-class to the
suburbs, leaving behind increased concentrations of poor people of
color. Cities became less able to absorb the poor through loss of em-
ployment opportunities, decline of public education, and diminish-
ment of political clout in federal and state fora. High demand in cities
for public services required high rates of taxation that discouraged
new economic growth.48
Poor minorities could not follow the white middle-class and the
jobs to the suburbs for many reasons, but especially because of exclu-
sionary zoning. After 1900, suburbs developed as separate local juris-
dictions, increasingly free in most places from any threat of
annexation by their generative cities. 49 Zoning greatly enhanced the
power of suburbs to pursue separate destinies. States played no role,
45. Id. at 171-73.
46. Id. at 150, 161-62.
47. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER (1985).
48. See, e.g., GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS (1999); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996).
49. See JACKSON, supra note 47, at 148-56.
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except to pass enabling legislation and appoint judges protective of
private property. After the Supreme Court's validation of suburban
zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. in 1926,50 suburbs
were free to pursue their own visions without regard to the needs of
the populations of the urban area as a whole and to treat those who
could not afford single family homes as nuisances.51 The practical
point was that the Court had validated standard zoning laws as per-
mitting each locality to create single-family housing zones to the ex-
tent favored by the locality itself. Suburbs eventually became adept at
drafting zoning ordinances to enhance property values, and therefore,
increase property tax receipts, minimize social irritants and the need
to provide local social services, and protecting successful separate
public education systems.52 Living in such favored circumstances un-
derstandably led many suburbanites to oppose social and educational
spending by state and federal governments because they felt little per-
sonal stake in the success of state or national programs and would pay
for much of them. 3 Racial segregation rose to historically high levels.
Lack of personal relationships or common purpose made it easy to
indulge race or ethnic prejudice to explain how "those people"
foundered.
The Supreme Court continued its protection of suburban prerog-
atives, reaching a remarkable apogee between 1973 and 1974. First, it
upheld, against an Equal Protection challenge, state laws financing
public education solely from local property taxes, despite its obvious
role in creating unequal educational opportunities for children in low-
income districts.54 In Village of Belle Terre,55 it resoundingly approved
a zoning ordinance that permitted within the village only single-family
homes composed of no more than two unrelated adults and their chil-
50. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
51. See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 597
(2001).
52. Although held to violate the New Jersey constitution in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975), and subject to limited attack under the laws of a few other states, exclusion-
ary zoning is generally entirely lawful and actively pursued. See generally VICKI Been & Robert
Ellickson, LAND USE CONTROLS 944 (2000).
53. See J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEo. L.J. 2265 (1997); Sheryll D.
Cashin, Localism, Self-interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers
to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000).
54. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Litigants have subsequently
turned to state courts to attack unequal funding in forty states, and twenty state supreme courts
have declared state funding plans unconstitutional. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and
Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 266-69 & nn.70-86 (1999).
55. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
[VOL. 46:405
Two Cheers for Gentrification
dren. Justice Douglas explained, in language chillingly free from
irony, that the police power was "ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people."56 Finally, and perhaps least
defensibly, it prohibited judges from remedying de jure racial segrega-
tion in cities through decrees that bound suburban school districts.57
The effect of these and other Court decisions58 was that, so far as the
federal Constitution was concerned, suburbs could enact laws that
made it economically impossible for low-income people to live there
and could preserve their educational resources only for the children of
residents, regardless of conditions in neighboring public schools.
Reformers have urged the enactment of statutes or adoption of
judicial doctrines to facilitate the migration of poor minorities to sub-
urbs.59 They have seen migration as opening up employment and edu-
cational opportunities for the poor, while relieving them from urban
concentrations of poverty and crime. Such prescription could find
support in the Gautreaux studies, which demonstrate enhanced educa-
tional and employment attainments by poor blacks relocating to
predominantly white, middle-class suburbs from segregated Chicago
public housing pursuant to a federal decree.60
Increased mobility for blacks generally has led many to relocate
in the suburbs.6' Yet, studies like that of William Julius Wilson sug-
gest that for remaining residents the situation actually deteriorated
56. Id. at 9.
57. Millikin v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
58. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (noting that exclusion of racial minorities from suburbs violates the Constitution only
when done with "invidious discriminatory purpose"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (deny-
ing standing to a broad array of plaintiffs seeking to challenge constitutionality of exclusionary
zoning).
59. The federal government, by using housing vouchers and studying the results, instituted
the "Moving to Opportunity" program designed to move low-income families to non-low income
areas. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 § 152, repealed by P.L. 105-276, Title
V, Subtitle C, § 550(f), 112 Stat. 2610 (1998). Studies of the program to date are reported in
Mark Shroder, Moving To Opportunity: An Experiment in Social and Geographic Mobility, 5
CITYSCAPE 57 (2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vol5num2/
shroder.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
60. See Florence W. Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and
Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479 (1995); see also James
E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Ed-
ucation, and Social Integration for Low Income Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1519 (1993).
61. See Sheryll Cashin, Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration, A Post-
Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 729 (2001).
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because of the departure of their more successful neighbors.62 Wilson
posited that inner city blacks suffered the consequences of "social iso-
lation," lacking contact with persons of a different class, or with per-
sons of different racial backgrounds, or both, which would concentrate
the effects of poverty and shape the life opportunities available, such
as "access to jobs and job networks, availability of marriageable part-
ners, involvement in quality schools, and exposure to conventional
role models."63
Gentrification needs to be assessed within this context. Many
poor, minority neighborhoods gained this character as a result of
white flight and dis-investment. Existing residents have limited re-
sources with which to improve their circumstances, faced with their
own problems and the need to cope with the consequences of their
neighbors' troubles. Urban economic development through govern-
ment programs has not been a notable success.6 4 Whatever political
power poor minorities may wield in the city often is truncated by the
financial fragility of the city government and its diminished influence
on state and federal government.
The arrival of more affluent residents provides a counter move-
ment to this pattern of metropolitan development over these past de-
cades. The studies finding poor residents are less likely to leave
gentrifying neighborhoods than other sections of the city suggest (al-
though they do not prove) that the process creates benefits for these
residents. Although social science proof of the existence of such ben-
efits is scarce, 65 some benefits are apparent from the reversal of the
62. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTXGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 56-62 (1987).
63. Id. at 61. "Wilson's concentration effects hypothesis has received almost universal em-
pirical confirmation." Michael Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corpora-
tions in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753, 759 (1996-
97); see also id. at n.33 (citing studies).
64. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377,
390-92 (1996); see also Nicholas Lemann, The Myth of Community Development, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9. 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 27.
65. The difficulty of providing empirical proof of such benefits is illustrated by the literature
concerning whether there is a neighborhood effect on the education or employment success of
low-income persons that can be isolated from other influences, such as family. In a study of the
literature that has achieved classic status, Christopher Jenkins and Susan E. Mayer concluded
that "even if neighborhood and school effects followed a simple underlying pattern in the real
world, our chances of detecting it would be low." Christopher Jenkins & Susan E. Mayer, The
Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER CITY POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 111, 173 (L.E. Lynn & M.F.H. McGeary eds., 1990). However, they offer, as
tentative hypotheses, that affluent neighbors are likely to be an advantage to the poor when they
"set social standards for one another or create institutions that serve an entire neighborhood,"
but are a disadvantage when they compete for "a scarce resource." Id. at 176.
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patterns of middle class exodus. The benefits to the low-income re-
sidents are economic, political, and social. Some can be realized only
in neighborhoods that are economically mixed; others require only
that the city as a political and taxing jurisdiction be diverse.
A. Economic
Persistent urban poverty cannot be eliminated by simple policy
measures. Nothing in this essay argues that social welfare or educa-
tion programs should not be pursued. Gentrification is not in any
sense a complete answer to the challenges poverty presents. Still, it
seems likely that gentrification can improve economic opportunities
for the urban poor.
At the simplest level, existing residents should find expanding
employment opportunities in providing locally the goods and services
that more affluent new residents can afford. Studies suggest that poor
people can find better employment in the suburbs than in the city.
66
The problem has been that inner city residents cannot reach these
suburban jobs because of distance and the lack of a necessary automo-
bile. While one may be concerned that local jobs generated by gen-
trification often will be low-paying, unskilled positions in restaurants
and shops, existing residents may need opportunities that do not re-
quire much education. A cause of the aggravation of urban poverty
has been the decline within cities of jobs not requiring higher educa-
tion.67 Gentrification may slow that trend by making investment in
new shops and local services more economically attractive. Also, new
residents will not generally compete with existing residents for such
jobs.68
Gentrification may also contribute to citywide enhancement of
employment for low-income residents. Increases in urban populations
will enhance demand for municipal services and thus the need for mu-
nicipal employment. They also will increase municipal tax receipts,
66. See Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 1528.
67. WILSON, supra note 62, at 39-42. Wilson notes:
Just as the changes in the economy have fundamentally altered the job market situation
for inner-city blacks, so too has the class and racial composition of urban public schools
and rcsidential neighborhoods been affected by population movements responding to
economic changes .... The flight of the more affluent families to the suburbs has
meant that the central cities are becoming increasingly the domain of the poor and the
stable working class.
Id. at 135-36.
68. See Jenkins & Mayer, supra note 65 (affluent neighbors are more likely to benefit the
poor when they do not compete for "scarce resource").
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making possible increases in public employment. Also, to the extent
that gentrification reflects increases in employment for higher edu-
cated persons within the city, such firms should also need to employ
lower educated persons for support functions.
Pioneers in neighborhood redevelopment were hampered by the
unwillingness of lenders to finance new construction or rehabilitation
of existing housing in depressed urban neighborhoods. This reflects
the legacy of redlining, by which lenders had adopted guidelines that
denied funds to urban areas in economic decline and with substantial
minority populations.6 9 Early gentrifiers found specialized lenders
willing to take mortgages, and their success eventually led banks to
provide home loans in urban areas. Thus, gentrification helped break
down barriers to real estate lending in cities, which makes it easier
today for urban residents at all income levels to buy a house or re-
model. Researchers Wyly and Hammel found that gentrifying neigh-
borhoods seem to be teaching mortgage lenders that they can lend
profitably in the central city.7" Unfortunately, their research finds no
evidence to date of expanded mortgage lending to blacks in gentrify-
ing neighborhoods.7 '
Gentrification should also improve shopping for low-income peo-
ple. Depictions of the effects of gentrification on retail tend to focus
on stereotypes of chain stores selling expensive frivolities replacing
indigenous businesses that were meeting the needs of poor people, for
example, Starbucks taking over a bodega. While such deleterious
changes undoubtedly happen as rents increase, they also reflect na-
tional retail trends. Offering these changes as an epitome of commer-
cial change in gentrifying neighborhoods is sentimental and
misleading. The inner city long has been plagued by inadequate shop-
ping, leading to prices for staples higher than in affluent suburbs with
more competition. Supermarkets and other discount retailers are as
likely to follow the affluent into the city as are cafes and boutiques,
even if their entry occurs only after a critical mass has been reached.
At the same time, existing merchants in gentrifying neighborhoods are
likely to welcome newcomers with money to spend. In all, gentrifica-
69. See JACKSON, supra note 47, at 197-218.
70. Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing Pol-
icy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 Hous. PoL'Y DEBATE 711, 763 (1999), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.orgprograms/hpd/pdfhpd-1004-wyly.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2003).
71. Id. at 760-61.
[VOL. 46:405
Two Cheers for Gentrification
tion should substantially enhance the quality and variety of goods and
services available to low-income people.
B. Political
Exclusionary suburban zoning persists because decisions are
made in a political forum in which poor people have a negligible
voice.7 2 Affluent people rationally make decisions furthering only
their interests in low taxes and good public education.7 3 At the same
time, urban residents have been stymied in their local deliberations by
the lack of resources; the voice of the poor has been heard largely by
only themselves, and despair sometimes has brought forth posturing
demagogues. Proposals for remedying this state of affairs frequently
suggest some form of regionalism, by which some decisions are re-
moved to state or regional entities.7 4 The expectation is that poor citi-
zens will have more of a voice in a larger political entity, which must
take account of their needs.
Gentrification creates urban political fora in which affluent and
poor citizens must deal with each other's priorities in a democratic
process. This creates opportunities for the poor to extract increases of
spending on services, while responding to demands for fiscal account-
ability. In such a process, the poor are likely to have the advantage of
numbers but be disadvantaged in terms of money and organization.
But it does create a democratic process in which they have power.
The increase in affluent voters also should increase the leverage
of cities in state and national fora. Cities have been centers of politi-
cal power for the disadvantaged, but their declining share of state
population and fiscal weakness decreases their strength. Gentrifica-
tion promises a slowing or reversal of that trend. Increasing poor citi-
zens' ability to bargain in other political arenas likely will have
benefits for poorer citizens.
C. Social
William Julius Wilson has posited that the urban culture of pov-
erty may be caused primarily by social isolation of poor blacks from
72. See FRUG, supra note 48, at 80-81; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841 (1994).
73. See Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1979).
74. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest and the Tyranny of the Favored Quar-
ter: Addressing the Barriers To the New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1958 (2000).
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"individuals and institutions that represent mainstream of society."7 5
He believes that between 1960 and 1985 the departure of more suc-
cessful blacks from poor inner city neighborhoods deprived remaining
residents of role models and contacts that buffered the effects of eco-
nomic change. 6 Changing this culture of poverty then requires break-
ing down the social isolation of the poor.7 7 This view has been highly
persuasive and undergirds HOPE VI, the federal government's chief
housing construction program, which seeks to replace traditional pub-
lic housing with mixed income, lower density subsidized housing."
Two researchers noted the following:
While debate on these questions persists, the consensus among pol-
icy makers is that poverty is fundamentally transformed by its spa-
tial concentration: When [sic] neighborhood poverty rates exceed
some critical threshold, contagion effects spread behavioral
pathologies through peer groups, while collective socialization er-
odes because children no longer see adults in positive role models as
educated workers and married parents .... 79
Gentrification can ameliorate the social isolation of the poor. °
New more affluent residents will rub shoulders with poorer existing
residents on the streets, in shops, and within local institutions, such as
public schools. Such newcomers may exhibit possibilities of social mo-
bility and a determination to secure adequate public services that pro-
vide existing residents with the kind of role models and contacts the
absence of which Wilson finds debilitating in the ghetto.
Many would want to question whether any such effects are plau-
sible. Some will posit a yawning cultural gulf between new, profes-
sional white residents and the existing poor, minority residents. After
all, the persons whose departure Wilson considered were primarily
middle-class blacks who supported black social and cultural institu-
tions, such as churches, that new residents are highly unlikely to join.
Will not racism and class bias lead the newcomers to shun existing
residents?
75. WiLsoN, supra note 62, at 60.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 60-62.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2003).
79. Wyly & Hammel, supra note 70, at 740.
80. Vigdor offers evidence that gentrification increases neighborhood economic diversity.
Vigdor, supra note 7, at 167-68; see also Wyly & Hammel, supra note 70, at 725 (In reinventing
distressed public housing, "[p]rivate market gentrification is a necessary, although by no means
sufficient, condition for market rate development and income mixing.").
[VOL. 46:405
Two Cheers for Gentrification
While relations between gentrifiers and existing residents will be
different from the relations between the latter and the departed black
middle class, and less mutually supporting in some important ways,
there are reasons to suppose that these new relationships can be mu-
tually enriching. The newcomers, after all, are choosing to move next
to existing urban residents rather than fleeing to outer suburbs. While
the grasp of racism can never be discounted, whites who choose to
move into inner city neighborhoods generally demonstrate with their
feet that they have less aversion to people of color than do whites as a
whole. Some newcomers affirmatively wish to live in diverse neigh-
borhoods with people of a different ethnicity and class. While racial
differences may limit the success of modeling that can occur, it reflects
a retrograde racial essentialism to maintain that modeling cannot oc-
cur or increase with familiarity. An advantage of the discrepancy be-
tween the economic orbit and educational levels of newcomers and
existing residents is that there is no competition for the same jobs, a
friction that often has poisoned race relations at the working class
level. Competition will occur in politics, of course, but so will collabo-
ration and log rolling.
Gentrified neighborhoods also are likely to experience reductions
in crime, especially violent crime."1 While one may surmise that such
neighborhoods may experience an increase in property crime, at least
in the short run, because the newcomers make more tempting targets,
there may be a decrease in the property crime directed at the existing
poorer residents. Moreover, new residents may be more successful in
securing increased policing from the city and will pay taxes making
such increases possible.8 2 For the same reason, the neighborhood may
receive general improvements in neighborhood services, such as sani-
tation and public libraries.
Public education is a key forum in which the presence of new-
comers can be helpful to existing residents. Studies show that there is
81. See Scott C. MacDonald, Does Gentrification Affect Crime Rates?, CRIME & JUSTICE,
1986, at 163. Preliminary studies from the "Moving To Opportunity" program suggest that low-
income persons moving to higher income areas are less likely to be victims of crime or to commit
violent crimes than those in a control group that remained in the inner city. See Shroder, supra
note 59, at 62-64. One study discussed therein suggests that juvenile movers may be more likely
to commit property crime, at least in the short run. Id. at 64.
82. MacDonald suggests that "crime itself serves as a feedback mechanism to deter the
stability of the gentrification process." See MacDonald, supra note 81, at 198. He notes that the
gentrifying neighborhoods he studied initially had crime rates well above those of their cities
generally, id. at 189-90, and that police protection was the urban service valued most highly by
the new residents. Id. at 197.
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a neighborhood effect on educational attainments; students will tend
to do better in schools that reflect diverse economic and educational
attainments among parents than in schools in which all families are
poor.83 This may be because more affluent parents push for higher
standards or because more affluent students exhibit a confidence that
study is worthwhile and will pay off in future social benefits. There
may be doubt that affluent newcomers will enter the local public
schools, given the problems such urban schools often exhibit and the
alternatives that newcomers can afford. While these concerns are se-
rious, many newcomers with children cannot comfortably afford pri-
vate education or they prefer public education. There are many
examples of newcomers working with existing residents to improve
local public schools.84 Many current mayors recognize that improving
public education will increase the pool of those willing to move into
urban neighborhoods and have made it a priority. Various school
choice initiatives could have complex effects on the probability of
such educational mixing.
The general points seem straightforward and plausible. To the
extent that the urban poor have been hurt by more affluent people
moving to the suburbs, they are helped by a return of affluent people
to the city. If poor people can achieve some better outcomes by mov-
ing to higher income suburbs, their opportunities should also be in-
creased if higher income persons move in substantial numbers to their
neighborhoods. Some of these benefits can be achieved only by the
poor who remain in a gentrifying neighborhood, while others can be
achieved by poor people in nearby neighborhoods or simply within
the city as a whole. Although these benefits to the poor are largely
hypothetical, they seem likely enough that cities should not adopt laws
to halt gentrification, lest these benefits be lost.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO GENTRIFICATION
My essentially rosy view of gentrification leads me to oppose
most of the limits that several legal writers have wanted to place on it.
They mistakenly seek to arrest a process that appears to be beneficial
83. Studies are collected and discussed in James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE. L.J. 2043, 2103-08 (2002).
84. E.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 5, at 22-23.
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both for the city as a whole and for its poor inhabitants.85 Prohibiting
poor people from being succeeded by more affluent people dooms the
neighborhood, and perhaps, the city to poverty. For example, Peter
Marcuse has proposed that cities designate neighborhoods in which it
would "allow essentially no new development or rehabilitation that
would have the effect of increasing rents or prices, or of displacing
households."86 This is akin to forbidding firms in a city to add new
employees because it would increase the demand for housing. Mar-
cuse might reply that development would be permitted in other areas
so long as it occurred on vacant land and included set asides for af-
fordable housing;87 but forcing development into less desired areas
will dampen the demand for housing and make it harder to finance
subsidies for affordable housing.
Urban policies should support gentrification generally, even as it
addresses some of the harms to which gentrification may contribute.
Appropriate goals for protective policies might include protection of
tenants directly displaced and more affordable housing in all neigh-
borhoods in the city. Under the urban renewal statutes, tenants dis-
placed by condemnation of their building for redevelopment were
entitled to relocation assistance.88 Some have proposed that tenants
displaced by gentrification should be eligible for moving and other
expenses from a government fund.8 9 If this fund were financed by
general revenues, it would marginally promote displacement, as te-
nants might not cling to a unit to avoid incurring moving costs. 90 Yet,
large problems would be encountered in designing such a system (just
as there are in studying displacement empirically) because it would be
difficult and costly to determine whether a tenant is moving involunta-
85. A pessimistic assessment of the probability of useful modeling in a mixed income hous-
ing development is offered in Michael H. Schill, Chicago's Mixed-Income New Communities
Strategy: The Future Face of Public Housing, 46 URBAN AFi. ANNUAL Rev. 135 (1997).
86. Marcuse, supra, note 28, at 232. Marcuse employs a broad definition of displacement
that includes any price rises that preclude the poor from formerly affordable units.
87. Id. at 232-34.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (2003).
89. Durham & Sheldon, supra note 29, at 36-38.
90. Durham and Sheldon are unclear about where the money to finance this assistance
should come. They repeatedly state, however, that the externalities from revitalization should
be internalized so that gentrification should occur only when it is efficient. Id. at 19-20. They
neither identify the external benefits from gentrification nor propose payments to gentrifiers to
internalize those. Id. Thus, they logically should propose a special tax on gentrifiers or
rehabilitators of buildings, as a way to internalize costs. But this ignores the external benefits of
gentrification. One would want to understand the magnitude of these general benefits, before
arguing for a tax that may deter the activity that produces them. Accordingly, I support a gen-
eral tax on real estate transfers to support a fund for affordable housing. See infra Part.IlI.
20031
Howard Law Journal
rily, and is thus displaced, and whether gentrification caused the
move. Unlike urban renewal, where the federal wrecking ball obvi-
ated any doubt about displacement or its cause, gentrification is a
complex and variable process where judgments about causation will
be uncertain.
Rent control, for all its well-known vices,91 may have some virtue
in blunting direct displacement. 92 A recent New York City study
points to rent control as an explanation for why gentrification does
not cause more displacement. 93 Should rent control seek to hold rent
for any unit permanently below'the market rate, it will bring on all the
ills of inefficiency and inequity that follow from the system. However,
moderate rent stabilization, which would slow the rate of increase in
any one year and increase the period for rent to rise to a new market
level, could prevent the frightening spikes in rent that sometimes oc-
cur in gentrifying neighborhoods and permit tenants to adjust to new
levels of demand.94 Also, rent control typically prohibits landlords
from refusing to renew a lease at its termination without good cause.
95
Moreover, rent control does not preclude, in principle, rehabilitation
of buildings because landlords typically can increase rent in other
units to pay for such costs. It does however, discourage rehabilitation
because it limits the profits to be gained from it. Ameliorating dis-
placement may not justify rent control, but it probably counts in its
favor. It certainly is not an answer to the problem of affordable
housing.
Low-income homeowners can be more easily protected against
being forced to sell prematurely by devices that do not distort the ba-
sic functioning of the market. Such homeowners may both be
harassed by rising costs and enjoy the benefit of a rapidly appreciating
asset-their home. To some extent, their problem is not poverty, but
the illiquidity of assets. Caps on annual increases in real property
taxes function like the moderate rent control, described above, to
make more gradual increasing burdens. Some cities permit abate-
91. See, e.g., ANTHONY DowNs, RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS: AN EVALUATION (1988);
Edgar 0. Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 931 (1991).
92. See Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Mar-
ket, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
93. Freeman & Braconi, supra note 38, at 2.
94. For example, rent increases in any year could be the average of unregulated rent in-
creases over the past three years in the same census tract. It is difficult in practice to set the rent
at the right level.
95. See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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ments in real property taxes for historic properties that are restored.96
Finally, some jurisdictions have revolving repair funds to lend money
to low-income homeowners to make repairs consistent with the re-
quirements of historic preservation laws, repayment being due only
upon sale of the house. 9 7 These seem like fair measures to ameliorate
the costs borne by low-income people to achieve the public benefits of
historic preservation.
Given the costs and uncertain benefits of efforts to assist dis-
placed renters, reformers should concentrate their efforts on effec-
tively addressing the lack of affordable housing for the urban poor,
particularly in economically integrated neighborhoods. Increased de-
mand for higher income housing leads, in the short run, to higher
rents and a decrease in affordable housing. But the deficiency in de-
sirable low-income housing reflects larger failures in public policy.
The private market will not generate new urban affordable housing
that meets minimum standards of acceptability; the rewards for the
developer are simply inadequate. The "filtering" or "trickle down" of
housing previously occupied by more affluent people has been the
dominant source of private low-income housing, but such aging hous-
ing often requires capital investments. Federal housing programs
have had some successes and many failures and provide fewer units
than are needed.9 8
Gentrification highlights the need for better housing policies and
suggests how they might be accomplished. Rather than regulate the
market in pursuit of more egalitarian results, the polity should put up
public money to provide housing that poor people otherwise cannot
afford.99 Regulations impose costs that may give some actors incen-
tives that are counterproductive. Government must find more re-
sources to finance construction or rehabilitation of more affordable
96. See Harry K. Schwartz, State and Local Real Property Tax Incentives for Historic Preser-
vation Property, 40 A.L. -A.B.A. 911, 913 (1999).
97. See Christopher Van Wyk, Preserving Historic Resources and Communities, at the Same
Time, 21 PRESERVATION L. REP. (forthcoming).
98. See generally Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance:
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990).
99. An interesting intermediate point is a District of Columbia law that gives tenants a right
of first refusal when their landlord seeks to sell the building to a third party. D.C. CODE §§ 42-
3402.02 - 3402.03 (2001). This gives tenants a limited form of equity in their apartment that can
become valuable either prompting a buy-out by the landlord to avoid a procedural tangle (reput-
edly the most common outcome) or permitting the creation of some form of tenant cooperative
that can buy the building using subsidized finance. See Jeanne Goldie Gura, Preserving Afforda-
ble Homeownership Opportunities in Rapidly Escalating Real Estate Markets, 11 J. AFFORDABLE
Hous. & COMTY. DEV. L. 78, 87 (2001).
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units and to support rent subsidy programs like the federal Section 8.
Regulatory policies can encourage such units to be located throughout
the urban region, avoiding the wicked concentrations of poverty that
plagued too much public housing. 10 Poverty creates deleterious ex-
ternal effects and the poor are less likely to exit poverty when they
need to cope with their own problems and fend off the effects of other
people's misery, such as crime, drugs, and educational failure.'
An example of the relationship between gentrification and af-
fordable housing that has attracted interesting commentary is an eval-
uation of the relationship between gentrification and HOPE VI, the
federal program to replace dilapidated public housing with mixed-in-
come housing at lower densities in an architectural form resembling
the surrounding neighborhood. A remarkable project built under
HOPE VI is The Townhomes on Capitol Hill, which has replaced the
abandoned Ellen Wilson Dwellings public housing project with 134
mixed-income, limited equity cooperative units that are designed by
the distinguished architect, Amy Weinstein, to evoke the Victorian
styles characteristic of the surrounding neighborhood.
A recent article by Professor Lynn Cunningham criticized the use
of HOPE VI in D.C. because of the existing market demand for urban
residences.1 "2 He discussed The Townhomes as a prominent example
of his concern. Professor Cunningham argued that placing HOPE VI
projects in gentrifying neighborhoods does not aid revitalization of de-
pressed neighborhoods, but serves chiefly to reduce the number of
units of affordable housing available in a market of spiraling rents and
prices. Conceding the dramatic improvement in conditions for low-
income people who obtain units in the Townhomes on Capitol Hill, he
concluded, "[firom the perspective of the approximately 20,000 low-
income households on the waiting list for DCHA housing or Section 8
vouchers, it looks like another tool in the hands of the area's gen-
100. Breaking down exclusionary zoning in the suburbs must be part of any strategy to en-
hance affordable housing in the metropolitan area. During the 1990s, the number of jobs in the
Washington metropolitan region reportedly increased by 412,000 but the number of dwellings by
just 204,000, leaving a calculated shortage of homes of 53,500; the greater growth of demand
over supply drives price increases and promotes gentrification. Peter Whoriskey, Prosperity
Feeds Housing Pinch; Working Families are Finding Fewer Affordable Options in Region, WASH.
POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at Al.
101. See Byrne, supra note 53, at 2281-82.
102. Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: Lessons
Learned from the D.C. Housing Authority's HOPE VI Projects, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. &
CoMTY. DEv. L. 353 (2001).
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trifiers to reduce the number of affordable units."' 3 He argues that
federal policy instead should be geared toward renovating and im-
proving management of existing public housing projects to maintain
the number of affordable units.'0 4
Professor Cunningham raises some valid concerns: HOPE VI
often reduces the number of units on-site for very poor residents in a
community where affordable housing opportunities are inadequate.
But he neglects several important considerations. As a political mat-
ter, HOPE VI would not exist at all if it did not entail the destruction
of distressed public housing projects, which Congress saw as a menace
to urban flourishing. But it also permits impressive experiments in
testing the ability of people of different income levels to live together
at The Townhomes on Capitol Hill literally cooperating. 105 Moreover,
such projects can work economically only if people are willing to buy
market rate units at a workable price because federal money must be
leveraged by private investment. A recent study shows what common
sense predicts: HOPE VI projects succeed best in gentrifying neigh-
borhoods that attract more affluent buyers."° Unlike conventional
public housing in the District, this project is racially integrated, al-
though majority black. Finally, the success and neighborhood accept-
ance of The Townhomes have greatly enhanced the attractiveness of
the immediate surroundings, where long vacant lots and abandoned
buildings are being developed.0 7 The success of HOPE VI in a gen-
trifying neighborhood actually represents the first successful govern-
ment program to integrate residential neighborhoods by income, 0 8 a
startling contrast to the patterns of exclusion that have typified metro-
politan development for 100 years.
103. Id. at 357.
104. Id. at 363.
105. The Townhomes on Capitol Hill is organized as a limited equity cooperative. This
means that low-income tenants build up equity by remaining in their units and taking proper
care of them, thus mimicking the incentives playing upon ordinary property owners. The equity
they can take away on sale is limited, however, so the unit can be re-conveyed at the subsidized
rate.
106. Wyly & Hammel, supra note 70, at 741. While a HOPE VI project itself rarely will spur
revitalization in a depressed neighborhood, the replacement of a traditional large public housing
project may permit otherwise existing market demand to prompt investment in an area.
107. Before the project was approved, I attended a neighborhood meeting called to mobilize
opposition and was the only person in attendance to speak and vote against a resolution con-
demning it. Today, the project is a matter of neighborhood pride.
108. "Gentrification tightens local housing markets, enabling the integration of the publicly
owned, affordable, and market-rate housing that is at the heart of HUD's reinvention." Wyly &
Hammel, supra note 70, at 745.
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Rather than change the focus of HOPE VI, new programs should
be used to increase the number of affordable units throughout more
affluent neighborhoods. The sites of existing public housing, the focus
of HOPE VI, generally reflect past efforts to push public housing into
the least commercially desirable sites and maintain a pattern of racial
segregation. Renovation of existing dilapidated apartment buildings
and construction of new houses on private land by non-profit develop-
ers or tenant organizations, assisted by government subsidized financ-
ing, have shown themselves to be the most promising vehicle for
meeting the need for low-income housing. The problem in cities for
some time has been lack of money to fuel such construction.
Gentrification actually may help here, as the increased demand
for market rate urban dwellings can create revenues that can be used
for low-income housing. The District of Columbia, for example, has
recently enacted legislation dedicating a portion of the real estate
transfer tax and other public funds to a trust fund to finance low- and
moderate-income housing."0 9 The soaring real estate market in the
District, significantly fueled by gentrification in several neighborhoods
as well as rising prices in neighborhoods long ago gentrified, has filled
the fund beyond expectations. This led the Mayor to propose halving
the percentage dedicated to the fund, but the Council and Mayor
eventually agreed not to cut the percentage, meaning that the fund
should have received $35 million by the end of 2003.11° While strong
demand to live in a jurisdiction will raise prices to the detriment of
some low-income residents, that demand can be leveraged into new,
affordable housing integrated with market rate housing. Set asides
and inclusionary zoning can work only where there is strong demand
for housing because it raises the cost to the developer.1 1' But, the
109. 2002 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-114 (amending D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-2801, 2802, 2802.01,
2802.03, 2803.01 (2002)).
110. D.C. Council Approves Full Funding For Housing; Trust Fund Could Bring More Af-
fordable Homes, WASH. POST, June 5, 2002, at B1. Budget woes recently led the city to limit the
funds actually allocated to the housing programs, setting off protests in favor of full funding.
David Nakamura, Cuts in Housing Program Take Protest to Williams, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
2003, at B8.
111. Montgomery County, Maryland, now requires all developments above fifty units to set
aside a portion of units for moderate-income residents. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE, Ch. 25A
(1997). Perhaps the most surprising and impressive program for funding affordable housing in
the nation flourishes in Florida, where the William E. Sadowski Affordable Housing Act, FLA.
SESS. LAW SERV. 92-317 (1992), dedicating a portion of state transfer tax, is projected to generate
over $250 million in fiscal year 2002-03. See 1000 Friends of Florida, Building Better Communi-
ties, available at http://www.1000friendsofflorida.org/Affordable-Housing/Affordable-Housing-
Main.asp (last visited February 5, 2002).
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transfer tax set-aside avoids problems with inclusionary zoning relat-
ing both to efficiency and fairness long ago identified by Robert El-
lickson, because the subsidy is raised from a large number of real
estate transactions involving both new and exiting residents. 1 2
Vigorous expansion of affordable housing throughout the city will
help prevent gentrifying neighborhoods from eventually becoming en-
claves of the affluent." 3 Much of my praise for gentrification relies on
its role in creating economically diverse neighborhoods. Yet, one
must worry that continuing demand for housing in a prime neighbor-
hood will eventually squeeze out all lower income residents, destroy-
ing the very diversity it initially fostered. One response to this
concern may be to discount long-term effects, since urban life always
is in transition, and great moments of neighborhood vitality may occur
at unpredictable points during a transition. A less fatalistic response
would be production of affordable housing within the neighborhood,
legally and financially secure from the effects of the market. This,
again, would not prevent displacement of individuals from market
housing but would insure people of all economic levels the advantages
of a diverse community.
CONCLUSION
On a recent Saturday, I attended a multi-family yard sale at the
nearby Townhomes on Capitol Hill with my wife and teenage daugh-
ter. The member co-op that manages the project had organized the
sale as a "community day." We strolled along the sidewalks chatting
with the residents about how they enjoyed living there and examining
their modest wares. We bought a number of paperbacks, many of
which were by black authors. My daughter bought a remarkable pink
suitcase, rather beat up, which perfectly met her sense of cool. My
wife, being who she is, reorganized several residents' display of goods
to show them off to better effect, to the delight of the sellers. I bought
and devoured a fried fish sandwich that Mrs. Jones was selling from
her apartment.
Such a modest event hardly makes news and certainly does not
cancel the injustices of our metropolitan areas. No public officials at-
112. Robert Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary Zoning," 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
Experience with housing trust funds in three cities is reviewed in Mary E. Brooks, Housing Trust
Funds: A New Approach to Funding Affordable Housing, 46 URBAN AFi. ANNUAL REV. 229
(1997).
113. See supra notes 80 and 105 and accompanying text.
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tended nor made claims for what it promised for the future. Yet it was
a time of neighborly intercourse, money circulation, and mutual learn-
ing. If multiplied many times, it promises a better future for our
communities.
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